WP4. ​Democratic Systems and National Cultures: Transition and Interplay of Values

The aim of this WP is to study the mechanisms and examine the patterns of interplay between political values, support for democracy and political trust on one side, and social, cultural, religious, and other values that constitute an important component of the national cultures in the EU, on the other. This WP will identify those social and cultural values, attitudes and beliefs which are congruent with the support for democracy and reinforce political trust, and those which hinder it. This WP will explore the interplay of political systems and national cultures in the EU area to examine those elements of value systems and groups of values which are congruent with sceptical or credulous trust as well as cynical mistrust. The findings will contribute to the complex understanding of the mechanisms of reproduction of political trust in the society, various types of trust and relevant policy measures to tackle it.

Work Package Leader: Prof. Christian Welzel, Leuphana University Luneburg, Germany.

Task 4.1. Cultural background of European democracies: examining the distribution of values and norms.

Much of the democratic backsliding literature sees reactionary ideological shifts in large population segments as a key reason for the rise of Right-Wing Populism (RWP)—shifts that supposedly fuel citizens’ distrust in democratic institutions and accordingly increase readiness to support RWP in its efforts to cut back on democracy’s liberal principles. The assumptions underlying this “standard narrative” of RWP’s rise are, however, more often stated than tested. Filling this void, we analyze data from the European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS), tracing the development of institutional trust among the EU's populations over a twenty-five years’ time span. Focusing on the four largest national populations from the EU's Western core, Nordic region, Mediterranean South, and post-communist East as exemplifications, we examine whether these national publics' middle class spectrum experienced polarizing ideological shifts on four key value dimensions: right-vs-left on economic issues, nativism-vs-cosmopolitanism on immigration issues, patriarchy-vs-emancipation on sexuality issues, economy-vs-environment on the sustainability issue. Specifically, we identify to what extent voter segments especially at the lower end of the middle class spectrum drifted ideologically away from the majority's emancipatory progression on immigration, sexuality and sustainability issues, thus increasing value polarization in ways that erode institutional trust and diminish support for liberal democracy, again especially in the lower middle class spectrum, with the consequence of increased readiness to support RWP in its efforts to weaken democracy’s liberal constitutional elements. Contradicting this "democracy eroding" narrative, our preliminary results provide no consistent confirmation that polarizing ideological shifts among European electorates' middle-class segments account for growing institutional distrust or anti-liberal shifts in voters' democratic preferences. Moreover, RWP-supporters are social class-wise only weakly differentiated and do not show a particularly high concentration in the lower middle class. Instead, the nature of their distinction is primarily socio-psychological, manifest in a deep-seated opposition against the non-RWP parties' liberal consent on immigration policy and the resulting institutional distrust for not having a voice among the parties of the pre-RWP era. These two distinctions –immigration opposition and its associated institutional distrust– reach into all middle-class segments and exist in spite of the fact that, overall, European electorates and especially their middle-class spectrum have actually become more (instead of less) tolerant of cultural diversity and immigration. We conclude that the problems accounting for RWP’s success do not originate in the electorates and the supposedly reactionary public opinion shifts in parts of them. Instead, the problems reside in accrued representation deficits with respect to grown non-voter camps whose immigration skepticism found no credible voice in the party systems of the pre-RWP era.

Task 4.2. Emancipate values and democratization.

As suggested by the modernization theory, while the desire for freedom, autonomy and respect for human rights is a universal human aspiration, it is not the top priority when basic needs such as physical survival are not satisfied. Desire for physical and economic security takes higher priority as long as physical survival is not granted. Growing emphasis on autonomy and self-expression values occurs after the basic physiological and safety needs are fulfilled (Inglehart 1997). One of the most empowering aspects of modernization derives from expanding education, information, and communication, which enhances people’s cognitive capacity and their ability to think for themselves. All of this gives rise to emancipative values, which transform allegiant into assertive citizens with an elite-challenging mindset (Welzel 2013). Hence, emancipative values, a specific subset of self-expression values that combines an emphasis on freedom of choice and equality of opportunities and involve priorities for lifestyle liberty, gender equality, personal autonomy, and the voice of the people, constitute the second large group of cultural patterns to be included into the analysis, including their antipode, the “traditional values” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Tessler 2002; Inglehart & Norris 2003). Results of the analysis of the patterns and dynamics of emancipative values in European countries and their influence on citizens' aspirations for democracy and political trust will be summarized in an analytical report (D4.2).

Task 4.3. Inequalities, trust, and democracy attitudes.

The driving force of rising emancipative values (that is improvements in living conditions) proceeds at different speed between both different countries and world regions – and different population segments inside the same societies. For this reason, income inequality has greatly increased over the decades and deprived the less educated lower middle class and working class (Welzel 2020). Social inequalities, which have also risen due to immigration of populations from economically poorer and culturally more traditional parts of the world, constitute an important macro-economic indicator that should not be neglected when exploring the cross-country and cross-regional variation in democratic values distribution. In this task we shall review the development of basic social inequalities and their anticipated role and impact in the reshaping of democracy in Europe over the last 10 years, using secondary data, such as Eurostat statistics, national statistics, other official materials, and specialized monographs. Key areas of focus include relative poverty, income distribution, private debt, housing /property, educational and gender inequalities (D4.3).