WP4. ​Democratic Systems and National Cultures: Transition and Interplay of Values

Task 4.1. Cultural background of European democracies: examining the distribution of values and norms.

Much of the democratic backsliding literature sees reactionary ideological shifts in large population segments as a key reason for the rise of Right-Wing Populism (RWP)—shifts that supposedly fuel citizens’ distrust in democratic institutions and accordingly increase readiness to support RWP in its efforts to cut back on democracy’s liberal principles. The assumptions underlying this “standard narrative” of RWP’s rise are, however, more often stated than tested. Filling this void, we analyze data from the European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS), tracing the development of institutional trust among the EU's populations over a twenty-five years’ time span. Focusing on the four largest national populations from the EU's Western core, Nordic region, Mediterranean South, and post-communist East as exemplifications, we examine whether these national publics' middle class spectrum experienced polarizing ideological shifts on four key value dimensions: right-vs-left on economic issues, nativism-vs-cosmopolitanism on immigration issues, patriarchy-vs-emancipation on sexuality issues, economy-vs-environment on the sustainability issue. Specifically, we identify to what extent voter segments especially at the lower end of the middle class spectrum drifted ideologically away from the majority's emancipatory progression on immigration, sexuality and sustainability issues, thus increasing value polarization in ways that erode institutional trust and diminish support for liberal democracy, again especially in the lower middle class spectrum, with the consequence of increased readiness to support RWP in its efforts to weaken democracy’s liberal constitutional elements. Contradicting this "democracy eroding" narrative, our preliminary results provide no consistent confirmation that polarizing ideological shifts among European electorates' middle-class segments account for growing institutional distrust or anti-liberal shifts in voters' democratic preferences. Moreover, RWP-supporters are social class-wise only weakly differentiated and do not show a particularly high concentration in the lower middle class. Instead, the nature of their distinction is primarily socio-psychological, manifest in a deep-seated opposition against the non-RWP parties' liberal consent on immigration policy and the resulting institutional distrust for not having a voice among the parties of the pre-RWP era. These two distinctions –immigration opposition and its associated institutional distrust– reach into all middle-class segments and exist in spite of the fact that, overall, European electorates and especially their middle-class spectrum have actually become more (instead of less) tolerant of cultural diversity and immigration. We conclude that the problems accounting for RWP’s success do not originate in the electorates and the supposedly reactionary public opinion shifts in parts of them. Instead, the problems reside in accrued representation deficits with respect to grown non-voter camps whose immigration skepticism found no credible voice in the party systems of the pre-RWP era.

Task 4.2. Emancipate values and democratization.

This report investigates institutional trust among European citizens, utilizing a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to reveal patterns of trust across eight European nations. Examining trust in various institutional domains—such as government, judiciary, and law enforcement—the study identifies four primary "trust classes": Low Trust, Political Trust, Law and Order Trust, and High Trust. Each class represents distinct trust profiles, shaped by socio-economic, political, and cultural factors. The findings highlight significant regional variations, with Scandinavian countries displaying the highest levels of institutional trust. In contrast, Southern and Eastern European nations reveal higher prevalence of Law and Order trust, often accompanied by skepticism toward electoral institutions. Through multilevel modelling, the report explores factors influencing trust class membership, including education, income, generalized trust, and political attitudes. The study emphasizes the nuanced relationship between institutional trust and democratic legitimacy, shedding light on trends that may influence populist voting behaviour and citizen engagement with democratic institutions. These insights offer implications for policy, suggesting that addressing socio-economic inequalities and fostering inclusive governance may bolster trust in political institutions across Europe. 

Task 4.3. Inequalities, trust, and democracy attitudes.

With the background of the geopolitical confrontation the paper proceeds in four sections. The first section discusses the gist and diverse misunderstandings in the treatment of modernization theory, especially concerning its "rational choice" contender: the median voter theorem (section two). In section three, we reflect the role of citizens' institutional trust within the global system rivalry between democracy and autocracy (or more generally between liberalism and coercion). The fourth section then places our thoughts and evidence into a broader sequence of the psychological forces driving democratic progress, regress or stagnation. As will become evident, citizens' institutional trust certainly has its place in this sequence, but in a different manner than is usually understood: What matters is not just the overall level or amount of institutional trust but whether and to what degree citizens' institutional trust is driven by emancipatory value standards that guide individuals from "devout" to "demanding" trustworthiness judgements concerning the institutions governing their public life.