Democratic Innovations and Political Trust: Bridging the Gap

Sarah A. Shirazi is a pioneering female lawyer from Pakistan with degrees in Global Health Law, American Law, and Taxation from esteemed U.S. institutions. Passionate about social justice and equitable policies, she leverages her legal expertise to address challenges in developing countries. Beyond her professional pursuits, she enjoys painting, traveling, and hiking, embracing diverse cultures and an active lifestyle. 

Citation: Shirazi, S. A. (2024). Democratic innovations and political trust: Bridging the gap. TRUEDEM Blog. https://www.truedem.eu/blog/blog7 

Since 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty coming into force, we have all been European citizens. Thirty-two years have passed, but few people still identify as European citizens. Outside the borders of the European Union, several countries aspire to join the Union, seeing it as a place that upholds rights and freedoms, a forward-looking entity capable of fostering growth and prosperity. The EU has a strong appeal because it is a privileged space. Yet, within EU borders, disaffection with the integration process and distrust in European institutions are growing.

Part of the crisis in European consciousness stems from the EU’s insufficient investment in strategies aimed at fostering a European identity. Ideas, programs, achievements, and political successes alone are not enough to guarantee the legitimacy of an institution or party. It is a question of perception: how each of us interprets our surroundings based on the information we receive and choose to accept. Therefore, the legitimacy and trust in an institution also depend on its ability to communicate its successes within a narrative that encompasses a historical vision - who we were, who we are, and who we will be - grounded in a value framework. This narrative defines identity and, thus, the sense of belonging to a community: the creation of the conditions for one's existence.

A Battle for Ideas 

History, especially when we talk about national memory and narrative, is often a contested terrain. It could hardly be otherwise: it is here that we seek legitimacy, motivation for the future, answers to the question «who are we», and thus criteria for inclusion and exclusion within a community. State, Nation, and people are «imagined communities» that require a continuous creation process. Although the European community was born as a response to the devastation of World War II, it has largely legitimized itself as an economic community, hoping that its benefits would build trust in the integration process. This has proven insufficient. The EU should have developed an inclusive identity and narrative based on shared values and the protection of diversity. Moreover, the resilience of a democracy is measured by its ability to broaden representation. This is an existential challenge, as it concerns the universalism of European values and the Union’s foundational principles. Thus, Europe’s response should be to create a narrative that unifies various identity groups - ethnic, gender-based, etc. - balancing particular and universal needs without erasing unique concerns.

Strength and Persistence of Nationalism

The persistence of nationalism’s strength became evident since the negotiations for the Nice Treaty in 2000, when significant challenges arose regarding the decision-making power of individual states. This was followed by the sinking of the European Constitution in 2005 due to the votes against by the Netherlands and France, reflecting the difficulties of ceding sovereignty by the member states, despite the fact that even then their difficulties in managing complex phenomena - inflationary spirals, economic crises such as that of 2008, which increased inequality among citizens, influencing their sense of belonging, international terrorism, migration flows - were evident. In the course of time, this difficulty turned into distrust and delegitimization of the democratic system: of the member countries, whose democracies were judged inadequate in the response given to the management of these phenomena and, therefore, perceived as absent with respect to the real needs of citizens; of the Union, also accused of elitism and of being the cause of the limitations that would restrict the fields of action of member states. This has fuelled a cycle of mistrust: member states, often for electoral reasons, have become even more resistant to ceding sovereignty, preventing the EU from managing complex issues due to a lack of powers and legitimacy.

In response to this crisis of trust, parties and movements opposing the EU, or advocating against further integration, have proposed an identity and concept of citizenship that is highly exclusive, often based on jus sanguinis, a sense of national culture and character, and a return to a mythical past pre-EU - effective in terms of communication but nonexistent historically - and more tacitly on racist and ant-Semitic characteristics. The ant-EU propose a redefinition of state structures, reducing the democratic process to electoral legitimization, to a plebiscitary dimension that is not proper to the democratic dialectic to which, in fact, is contrasted the securitarian necessity and penal populism: the idea that social problems can be resolved through the introduction of harsher penal measures motivated by recourse to the category of emergency. The consequences are restrictive policies towards the rights of non-EU citizens, limitations on journalist activity and right to manifest - emblematic are the cases of France and Italy - as noted in the latest report by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The adoption of these measures and the imagery referred to by the nationalist galaxy is facilitated by the persistence, in Europe, of the 20th century legacy: that of dictatorial regimes, colonialism, racist and ant-Semitic theories. These retreated common legacies represent forms of historical continuity which, depending on the country, may be institutional and jurisprudential and/or of mentalities, stereotypes and prejudices - a much studied case in point is Italy, where, for example, the law of public security and the Penal Code date back to fascism. We should not underestimate these aspects on which, on the contrary, the EU should invest in order to foster historiographical research.

A Strategy of Truth: Sot Power and Propaganda

To respond to these crises, it is necessary to invest in research that, based on nationalisms and their persistence with respect to the integration process, identifies basic criteria for defining European identity. Research aimed at creating awareness of a common heritage to weaken the power of national identity concepts within member states’ nationalisms, and research focused on understanding how European citizens are represented, along with their perceptions, mindsets, and attitudes.

We are defining a strategy of truth: a benevolent form of propaganda, not based on manipulation but on truth, aimed at countering propaganda opposed to the Union, promoting awareness of its merits, and fostering a sense of European identity. This strategy must be composed of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy, strengthening European soft power: the legitimacy created by the intertwining of attraction, fascination and seduction guaranteed by the strength of a country's narrative and identity.

Public diplomacy concerns the range of practices aimed at improving communication between citizens in order to create mutual understanding. In our case, public diplomacy will have to disprove the theories of secrecy, conspiracy and remoteness of European institutions, showing instead their proximity and transparency - a greater presence of European representatives in the territories will also be crucial.

Cultural diplomacy uses culture to convey European values, thus creating a sense of community that is value-based, historical, and identity-based through the cross-cultural sense of belonging that can be provided by the perception of common cultural traits. In cultural diplomacy strategies, the use of popular culture is crucial because it reaches a larger audience than “high” culture, and does not have to be associated with state action. In fact, the EU should encourage creation, including investments that facilitate the emergence of European media, publishing, record and film companies by involving citizens, artists and industries in this creative endeavour.

Crucial to both public and cultural diplomacy will be the inclusion of mobility programs – i.e. mobility embedded within a value framework. Interrail, for example, must be facilitated, but those who participate in it must know - for example, with short brochures given with the ticket or with advertising campaigns - that they are participating in a European project and moving within a single country. The same must be done for Erasmus, which will have to be extended to high schools while also providing new forms of mobility for workers in each category-for example, by providing bonuses for those who take part. Any mobility will have to be accompanied by public resources for the study of English and other community languages. Investing in European confidence and identity means creating an environment that encourages travel and fosters the formation of inter-European families. What is needed is a European New Deal: an infrastructure investment plan focused on creating jobs through government action, thereby strengthening confidence in the Union. Part of this effort should target telecommunications companies, which must be European and free of roaming charges; similarly, there should be European healthcare and pension systems to support all workers within the EU.

By following this path, we will not only forge a shared narrative and identity, but also legitimize the process of federalization, transforming Europe into a living dream. «Europe» will become a term symbolizing the mythical, aspirational vision of a life project that intertwines personal and national destines: an ongoing creation in which citizens play the leading role, restoring confidence in the European Union.